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Freud on the Court: Re-interpreting 
Sexting & Child Pornography Laws 
Matthew H. Birkhold 
 
Although many developments in child pornography law are 
troubling, perhaps the most disconcerting is the growing number 
of cases in which children are being charged with violating child 
pornography laws for engaging in “sexting,” or sending sexually 
explicit photographs via cellular phones or over the Internet.  
Although the law implicitly considers children the victims of child 
pornography and the photographer and audience as punishable 
perpetrators, this logic is challenged by sexting cases.  Yet in many 
instances, children who take and send “lascivious” pictures of 
themselves have been charged with violating the very law designed 
to protect them from the harms associated with child pornography.  
As a result, many scholars have recently decried the law as unjust 
and questioned its confusing motives. 
Existing scholarship has roundly criticized the situation’s 
ostensible absurdity, but little work has been done to understand 
the legal motives for charging juveniles in sexting cases.  This 
Article endeavors to better understand the motivation behind the 
law’s perplexing stance on teenage sexting.  A close analysis of 
recent sexting cases reveals a remarkable correlation between 
Freud’s theory of sexuality and sexting jurisprudence.  Beginning 
with the first Supreme Court decision on child pornography, New 
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York v. Ferber, subsequent Supreme Court and District Court 
decisions on child pornography and sexting have been based on a 
strikingly Freudian logic.  Perhaps fittingly, the alignment with 
Freud is subconscious: no court has acknowledged that its 
decision rests on a reading of Freud.  Yet, as this article shows, 
Freud offers an extraordinarily accurate theoretical account of 
what judges have done in recent sexting cases. 
Understanding sexting cases in light of Freud does more than 
just explain the bewildering decisions of state and federal courts to 
uphold convictions against children for violating child 
pornography laws.  In light of this unexpected finding, this article 
also provides a new basis from which to assess the goals of the 
law.  As prosecutors continue to bring charges against teenagers 
for sexting, this article offers judges an alternate model for 
thinking about these difficult cases.  Moreover, as more state 
legislatures draft new rules governing teenage sexting—in 2012 
thirteen states considered resolutions aimed at sexting—this article 
proposes that lawmakers either abandon or correct their 
subconscious Freudianism in sexting cases, offering suggestions 
about how better to deal with teenagers who sext. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Child pornography law is a recent invention of the Supreme 
Court, which first held in 1982 that states may prohibit the 
depiction of minors engaged in sexual conduct.1  Since then, the 
law of child pornography “has been left alone to occupy its own 
peculiar and unpleasant realm,” spawning a disturbing body of 
case law complicated by inconsistent state and federal regulations.2  
Although many developments in child pornography law are 
troubling, perhaps the most disconcerting is the growing number of 
cases in which children are being charged with violating child 
pornography statutes for engaging in “sexting.”3 
These cases have engendered a two-part debate.4  One dispute 
centers on the appropriate response “to adolescents who 
voluntarily produce and disseminate sexually explicit images of 
themselves.”5  The other discussion concentrates on the 
constitutionality of prosecuting teens under existing child 
pornography laws and the potential conflicts with First 
Amendment jurisprudence.6  Nevertheless, the debate about 
sexting has been largely ignored by legal scholars.  To date, only a 
few articles explicitly address sexting and the reach of child 
pornography law.7  While each article makes different 
 
 1 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982).  In Ferber, the first Supreme 
Court case to consider child pornography, the Court created an exception to the First 
Amendment by unanimously holding that “child pornography” constituted speech 
without constitutional protection. Id. at 753, 766.  For an explanation of how Ferber 
relates to sexting, see infra Part II, and for more comprehensive analysis of the case and 
its significance, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 
930 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, First Amendment] (explaining that the unanimous decision 
of the court in Ferber is “extremely rare in First Amendment cases”). 
 2 Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 211 
(2001) [hereinafter Adler, Child Pornography].  
 3 See Sarah Wastler, The Harm in “Sexting”?: Analyzing the Constitutionality of 
Child Pornography Statutes that Prohibit the Voluntary Production, Possession, and 
Dissemination of Sexually Explicit Images by Teenagers, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 687, 
687–88 (2010). 
 4 See id. at 688. 
 5 Id. at 689. 
 6 See id. at 688–89. 
 7 See Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Crime and Punishment: Teen Sexting in Context, 
115 PENN ST. L. REV. 135, 168 (2010).  Although much scholarship deals with child 
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recommendations about how best to improve child pornography 
laws to accommodate the growing practice of sexting, the 
assumption about the law is generally the same: the law is flawed 
and in need of improvement.8  With regard to juvenile prosecutions 
for sexting, child pornography law has been variously described as 
haphazard,9 out-dated,10 draconian,11 nonsensical,12 foolish,13 
outrageous,14 and unjust.15 
 
pornography, little attention has been explicitly devoted to youth sextingJulia Halloran 
McLaughlin counted no more than eight articles in 2010. Id. 
 8 See, e.g., Mallory M. Briggs, “Send Me a Picture Baby, You Know I’d Never Leak 
It”: The Role of Miller v. Mitchell in the Ongoing Debate Concerning the Prosecution of 
Sexting, 19 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 169, 192 (2012) (“Taking a picture of oneself to 
disseminate may not fit into the actual meaning or intent of [child pornography 
statutes].”); McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174 (“Child pornography law is designed to 
protect children from physiological, emotional, and mental health trauma associated with 
the creation and distribution of the material.  None of these policy objectives are achieved 
by criminalizing non-obscene teen sexting conduct.”).  Though, not everyone finds the 
laws fully unreasonable. See, e.g., Mary Graw Leary, Self-Produced Child Pornography: 
The Appropriate Societal Response to Juvenile Self-Sexual Exploitation, 15 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 1, 45–48 (2007) (arguing that sexting teens should be required to register as 
sex offenders); Megan Sherman, Sixteen, Sexting, and a Sex Offender: How Advances in 
Cell Phone Technology Have Led to Teenage Sex Offenders, 17 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
138, 156 (2011) (“Although teenagers should not be charged under the existing child 
pornography statutes for sexting, it does not mean that states should completely 
decriminalize the behavior.”). 
 9 Briggs, supra note 8, at 201 (arguing that “[p]rosecutors’ unfocused and haphazard 
attempts to deal with the problem [of sexting] are partially due to technology’s ever-
changing face”). 
 10 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 137 (contending that “[t]echnology has, once 
again, outpaced the law”). 
 11 Antonio M. Haynes, The Age of Consent: When is Sexting No Longer “Speech 
Integral to Criminal Conduct”?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 373 (2012) (discussing the 
“increasingly draconian legislative responses” to child pornography in light of teenage 
sexting). 
 12 Robert H. Wood, The Failure of Sexting Criminalization: A Plea for the Exercise of 
Prosecutorial Restraint, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 151, 177 (2009) (“[I]t is 
nonsensical that teens may marry and have consensual sex at the age of sixteen in some 
states, but a photographic image of their sexual exploits could send them to prison.  It is 
equally illogical that minors have the right to abortions and contraceptives, but the sexual 
activity surrounding those rights is illicit. Our laws should be revised to accommodate 
these realities.”). 
 13 Amanda M. Hiffa, OMG TXT PIX PLZ: The Phenomenon of Sexting and the 
Constitutional Battle of Protecting Minors from their Own Devices, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 
499, 530 (2011) (“Criminalizing sexting is as foolish as the behavior itself.”). 
 14 See Dr. JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional 
Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 951, 952 (2011) (“Most media reports have described 
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Although scholarship has roundly criticized the situation’s 
ostensible absurdity, little work has been done to understand the 
legal motives for charging juveniles in sexting cases.16  Yet 
meaningful solutions can be developed only by understanding the 
underlying motivation of judges.  This Article proposes doing just 
that by turning to Sigmund Freud.  Reinterpreting recent case law 
in light of Freud’s theory of sexuality offers new insight into the 
perplexing stance on sexting taken by judges, legislators, and 
prosecutors across the country.  This insight helps to explain the 
legal actions many scholars consider unreasonable by uncovering 
an ideological consistency undergirding the charges brought 
against teenagers for violating child pornography laws. 
Surprisingly, evaluating these cases from a Freudian 
perspective reveals a remarkable correspondence between child 
pornography jurisprudence and Freud’s diphasic understanding of 
sexuality.  Even if Freud never thought about sexting, it is clear 
that the court, at least unconsciously, is thinking about Freud.  This 
insight offers an explanation for the much-maligned decisions of 
state and federal courts to uphold convictions against children for 
violating child pornography laws and also provides a new basis 
from which to assess the goals of the law. 
By analyzing leading U.S. District Court decisions on sexting, 
as well as the first appellate court decision to address the problem, 
Miller v. Mitchell,17 this Article examines trends in the ways in 
which judges and prosecutors across jurisdictions deal with the 
thorny issue of teenage sexting.  To better understand the rationale 
in these decisions, this study reinterprets New York v. Ferber,18 the 
first Supreme Court case on child pornography, along with the 
 
these situations with outrage, and that is understandable because the so-called victim of 
child pornography is being treated as the perpetrator.”). 
 15 Sherman, supra note 8, at 156 (describing as “unjust” the prosecution and 
punishment of teenagers who engage in sexting). 
 16 See id. at 159 (“The prosecution of teenagers represents a clear example of what can 
happen when laws built on past cultural values are forced to address unanticipated social 
phenomena.”); see also McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 154 (“In dissent, Justice Padovano 
objected to the majority’s reliance upon § 827.071 to punish the minor defendant, since 
the law was actually designed to protect this defendant.”). 
 17 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 18 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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2002 Supreme Court decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, striking down as overbroad two provisions of the 1996 
Child Pornography Prevention Act,19 and the 1990 Supreme Court 
decision in Osborne v. Ohio, allowing states to outlaw the 
possession of child pornography.20  After discussing representative 
cases, Part I of this article diagnoses as unreasonable the decisions 
of many federal courts to charge teenagers with violating child 
pornography statutes.  Part II next describes Freud’s theory of 
sexuality and Part III interprets the motives behind prominent 
sexting decisions, expounding the striking similarities between 
Freud’s anxiety about psychosexual development and the concern 
of judges and prosecutors who charge children with violating child 
pornography laws.  In light of this unexpected finding, this Article 
concludes by making recommendations about how judges and 
legislators should best think about teenage sexting as it relates to 
child pornography. 
I. IS THE LAW UNREASONABLE? 
Federal courts have routinely recognized the production and 
dissemination of child pornography as a social problem, most 
recently naming it “cancerous”21 and “one of the serious scourges 
 
 19 See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121.1(2), 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256–58 (2002) 
(discussing the overbreadth of § 2256(8)(B) and § 2256(8)(D) of the Child Pornography 
Prevention Act of 1996).  The Act restricted child pornography on the Internet, covering 
both pornography using real children as well as virtual child pornography. 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2251(1) & (5).  Before the C.P.P.A was passed, Congress based restrictions on the 
distribution of child pornography as set forth in New York v. Ferber. See Ashcroft, 535 
U.S. at 241 (“Before 1996, Congress defined child pornography as the type of depictions 
at issue in Ferber.”). 
 20 See 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
 21 United States v. Campbell, 738 F. Supp. 2d 960, 962 (D. Neb. 2010).  Although 
Judge Kopf readily labels all child pornography “cancerous,” he cleverly distinguishes 
the metastatic from the more benign forms of child pornography.  In Campbell, the court 
reasons that, though the material in question “does involve young girls between the 
approximate ages of 13 and 15 behaving in a libidinous manner and lasciviously 
exposing themselves,” the images are “also relatively tame from a qualitative point of 
view.” Id. at 963.  Whether we think the court should be involved in a “careful review of 
the images,” as here, is a question for another time. Id. at 962; see also Adler, Child 
Pornography, supra note 2, at 265. 
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of our time.”22  In the Supreme Court’s estimation, child 
pornography is especially reviled because it “harms and debases 
the most defenseless of our citizens.”23  Children are thus the clear 
victims of child pornography, while the photographer and 
audience, correspondingly, are considered punishable 
perpetrators.24 
This reasoning, however, is challenged by the increasingly 
widespread practice of “sexting,”25 a portmanteau of “sex” and 
“texting” describing the transmission of sexually explicit 
photographs via cellular phones or over the Internet.26  Under 
federal law, child pornography includes any visual depiction that 
involves or appears to involve a minor engaging in “sexually 
explicit conduct.”27  Prohibited depictions of sexual conduct 
encompass both explicit sex acts as well as “lascivious 
exhibitions,”28  which has been broadly interpreted by the Court to 
include images that do not even depict nudity.29  To be considered 
 
 22 Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 696 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 23 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008). 
 24 See Sherman, supra note 8, at 143–44 (“All fifty states and the District of Columbia 
have child pornography statutes that make it illegal to possess, produce, and/or distribute 
child pornography.”). 
 25 See Tamar Lewin, Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youth Texting, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 20, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/21/us/21sexting 
.html?_r=0 (“One recent survey found that about one in five teenagers reported having 
engaged in sexting.”). 
 26 Although sexting can also describe strictly verbal messages, for the purposes of this 
article “sexting” is limited to the transmission of sexually explicit images. See Clay 
Calvert, Kara Carnley Murrhee & Jackie Marie Steve, Playing Legislative Catch-Up in 
2010 with a Growing, High-Tech Phenomenon: Evolving Statutory Approaches for 
Addressing Teen Sexting, 11 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 51 (2010). 
 27 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2006). “‘Sexually explicit conduct’ means actual or 
simulated (i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or 
oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) 
masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person.” Id. 
 28 Id.  For a brilliant reading of the ways in which law has influenced how we look at 
child pornography, see Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2. 
 29 See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (concerning, in part, 
children wearing only swimsuit bottoms); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 737 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“All of the children wore bikini bathing suits, leotards, underwear, or other 
abbreviated attire while they were being filmed.”).  In Knox, the defendant possessed 
videos, in which the genital areas of clothed girls were closely zoomed. Id. at 737.  
Although the Supreme Court remanded the case, the Third Circuit maintained its holding 
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child pornography, images must instead meet some or all of six 
factors that constitute a “lascivious exhibition,” for instance, 
whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or if the setting 
is sexually suggestive.30  As a result, nearly “everything becomes 
child pornography in the eyes of the law,”31 from children on the 
beach32 to children dancing and gymnasts dressed in leotards.33 
 
that child pornography does not require the depicted child to be nude. See Adler, Child 
Pornography, supra note 2, at 240.  For more about the Knox case and its aftermath, see 
id. at 239–40, 260. 
 30 United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986).  As Adler explains, 
“[t]he leading case on the meaning of ‘lascivious exhibition’ is United States v. Dost, a 
California district court case that announced a six-part test for analyzing pictures,” known 
today as the “Dost Test.” Adler, First Amendment, supra note 2, at 953.  According to 
Dost,  
 [i]n determining whether a visual depiction of a minor constitutes a 
‘lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area’ under § 
2255(2)(E), the trier of fact should look to the following factors, 
among any others that may be relevant in the particular case: 1) 
whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child’s 
genitalia or pubic area; 2) whether the setting of the visual depiction 
is sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose generally associated 
with sexual activity; 3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural 
pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; 4) 
whether the child is fully or partially clothed, or nude; 5) whether the 
visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in 
sexual activity; 6) whether the visual depiction is intended or 
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. Of course, a visual 
depiction need not involve all of these factors to be a ‘lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.’ The determination will have 
to be made based on the overall content of the visual depiction, 
taking into account the age of the minor. 
Dost, 636 F. Supp. at 832.  The six factors, however, are not meant to be exhaustive. See 
Adler, First Amendment, supra note 1, at 953 n.144.  In addition to documenting 
jurisdictions that have adopted the Dost test, Adler argues that the Dost test “has 
produced a profoundly incoherent body of case law” Id. at 953. 
 31 Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 264 (“Child pornography law constitutes 
children as a category that is inextricable from sex.  The process by which we root out 
child pornography is part of the reason that we can never fully eliminate it; the circularity 
of the solution exacerbates the circularity of the problem.  Child pornography law has a 
self-generating quality. As everything becomes child pornography in the eyes of the 
law—clothed children, coy children, children in settings where children are found—
perhaps everything really does become pornographic.”). 
 32 In United States v. Horn, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
employed the Dost test to find that the images in question constituted child pornography. 
187 F.3d at 789.  The court explained that “[i]n the beach scenes, the girls are wearing 
swimsuit bottoms, but a reasonable jury could conclude that the exhibition of the pubic 
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Under these standards, the term “child pornography” is 
beleaguered by both vagueness and overbreadth, as even the most 
innocent family images could fall within the over-inclusive 
definition.34  Consequently, when a minor takes and sends a 
lascivious picture of his- or herself, the sexted image easily 
amounts to “self-produced child pornography.”35  As a result, the 
child can effortlessly be charged with violating child pornography 
laws36—and, depending on the jurisdiction, the recipient can be 
charged with possessing child pornography.37  In these cases, the 
child is simultaneously considered the victim and the perpetrator.38  
As a result, in sexting cases, prosecutors and judges must decide 
whether the victim should be punished.39  In many instances, these 
legal actors have decided to punish juvenile sexters for violating 
child pornography laws, prompting widespread confusion over the 
 
area was lascivious despite this minimal clothing because of the way in which the 
pictures are framed,” noting that “[t]he ‘lascivious exhibition’ is not the work of the 
child, whose innocence is not in question, but of the producer or editor of the video.  In 
this case, the producer or editor generated a product that meets the statutory definition of 
sexually explicit conduct.” Id. at 790. 
 33 See Knox, 32 F.3d at 737 (“All of the children wore bikini bathing suits, leotards, 
underwear, or other abbreviated attire while they were being filmed. . . . In some 
sequences, the child subjects were dancing or gyrating in a fashion not natural for their 
age.”).  For further context and explanation of the videos, see also Adler, Child 
Pornography, supra note 2, at 260. 
 34 See Adler, First Amendment, supra note 1, at 941 (The law “presents obvious 
problems of vagueness and overbreadth.”). 
 35 Leary, supra note 8, at 4, 4 n.8 (describing “minors who produce images of 
themselves in sexually explicit poses or engaged in sexual conduct and display or 
distribute them to others” as practicing a form of “self-exploitation”). 
 36 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing 
child pornography charges brought against a sixteen-year-old girl and her seventeen-year-
old boyfriend for taking photographs of them engaged in sexual behavior). 
 37 See id. at 235 n.1 (noting that the boyfriend was also charged with one count of 
possession of child pornography).  Because the definition of child pornography varies 
from state to state, there are several ways to charge teens with violating child 
pornography statutes for engaging in sexting. See Melissa Wells et al., Defining Child 
Pornography: Law Enforcement Dilemmas in Investigations of Internet Child 
Pornography Possession, 8 POLICE PRAC. & RES. 269, 270 (2007). 
 38 See Leary, supra note 8, at 5–6 (discussing the societal dilemma in balancing the 
punishment necessary to combat child pornography with the possibility that “self-
exploitation is an act by a minor perhaps not fully mature enough to recognize the harms 
caused”). 
 39 See id. at 48. 
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law’s motives and protest about the resulting “miscarriage of 
justice.”40 
Recent arrests in Pennsylvania, Florida, and New Jersey typify 
the cases fueling the debate about whether children are being 
unfairly charged with violating child pornography statutes for 
sexting.41  Although there is currently no universal legislative 
response to sexting as it relates to child pornography, the cases 
discussed below are representative of the behavior considered 
punishable, as well as indicative of the common motivation for 
punishing the very victims the law intends to protect.42 
The Third Circuit became the first federal appellate court to 
address sexting and the reach of child pornography law in Miller v. 
Mitchell.43  In 2008, school officials at Pennsylvania’s 
Tukahannock High School discovered nude and semi-nude images 
of teenage girls on students’ confiscated cell phones.44  In one 
image, two girls were wearing opaque bras and another photograph 
showed a third girl wearing a towel around her torso with her 
breasts exposed.45  In the judgment of the district attorney, these 
images constituted child pornography.46  Consequently, he 
 
 40 Sherman, supra note 8, at 159. 
 41 See Lewin, supra note 25.  Child pornography charges for sexting can take many 
forms.  The examples given here are representative of the variety of acts that can be 
considered self-produced child pornography.  Depending on the jurisdiction, charges can 
be brought against the teenager-sexter as the disseminator of child pornography as well as 
the recipient as the possessor of child pornography.  In part, it depends on how the six (or 
more) factors of the Dost test are interpreted by the court. See United States v. Dost, 636 
F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986).  However the Dost test compels the court to take a 
disturbingly close examination of such images.  For a disturbing example of how the 
Dost-test compels the court to closely examine such images, see United States v. Wolf, 
890 F.2d 241, 244–45 (10th Cir. 1989).  
 42 See generally Catherine Arcabascio, Sexting and Teenagers: OMG R U Going 2 
Jail???, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2010) (noting that, depending on the state, a variety of 
factors are relevant to charging children with violating child pornography laws, 
including: the age of the actors depicted; the age of the recipients; whether the image was 
created and sent with consent of the depicted child; the intent of the children involved; 
the extent of further dissemination beyond the first recipient).  
 43 See Wastler, supra note 3, at 689. 
 44 See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing plaintiffs’ 
complaint, the evidentiary hearing, and the District Court’s opinion). 
 45 See id. at 144. 
 46 See id. at 142 (“In 2008, the District Attorney of Wyoming County in Pennsylvania 
presented teens suspected of ‘sexting’ with a choice: either attend an education program 
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threatened to prosecute the girls depicted (and the teens whose 
phones contained the digital pictures) for distributing and 
possessing child pornography, a felony charge, unless the teens 
successfully completed a program focused on education and 
counseling.47  Ultimately, the case was dropped,48 but other 
juvenile-sexters have not been as lucky.49 
In 2009, one year before the Miller decision, a fourteen-year-
old New Jersey girl posted thirty “racy pictures” of herself on the 
Internet for the sake of her boyfriend.50  Initially, the student faced 
up to seventeen years in prison and life-long registration as a sex 
offender, if convicted.51  Eventually, the Passaic County 
Prosecutor’s Office dropped the child pornography charges, but 
only on the condition of the girl’s successful completion of six 
months of counseling.52 
In other cases, teenage sexters are actually convicted.53  In A.H 
v. State, for instance, a Florida appellate court upheld the 
conviction of a sixteen-year-old girl for violating state child 
 
designed by the District Attorney in conjunction with two other agencies or face felony 
child pornography charges.”). 
 47 See id. at 143.  To avoid prosecution, most of the students involved agreed to 
participate in the five-week education program. See Wastler, supra note 3, at 689–90.  
Three students and their parents, however, filed suit Civil Rights Act section 1983 
complaint against Skumanick, alleging that the threat of prosecution for not participating 
in the educational program violated their First Amendment rights to free expression and 
freedom from compelled expression. Id.  The parents additionally alleged violation of 
their Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct their children’s upbringing. Id.; see Verified 
Complaint  paras. 59, 64–66 Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009) 
(No. 09CV00540). 
 48 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (In the end, the 
court found a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiffs would prevail and granted a 
temporary restraining order prohibiting the district attorney from filing criminal charges 
against the plaintiffs for producing the sexted images in question.). 
 49 See Lewin, supra note 25. 
 50 See Sherman, supra note 8, at 145; see also Lewin, supra note 25.  (While it is 
unclear whether the “sexually explicit” photographs might be considered child 
pornography of the metastatic or benign variety, I have, for obvious reasons, not tried to 
locate the images.).  
 51 See Sherman, supra note 8, at 145. 
 52 See N.J. Teen Won’t Face Child Porn Charges for Posting Nude Photos of Self on 
MySpace, FOX NEWS (June 23, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/story/ 0,2933,528602,00. 
html. 
 53 See Lewin, supra note 25. 
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pornography statutes after she sexted her seventeen-year-old 
boyfriend in 2007.54  A.H. and her boyfriend had engaged in 
consensual sexual conduct and A.H. took several pictures of the 
act.55  For subsequently sending the pictures to her boyfriend, A.H. 
was charged with violating state child pornography laws.56  
Notably, neither teen sent the images to a third party, but because 
of her age, A.H. was charged with producing, directing, and 
promoting child pornography.57 
Instinctually, it might seem outrageous to charge the teenagers 
in these cases for violating child pornography laws; after all, they 
do not seem like the perpetrators the law originally intended to 
punish.58  Likewise, the possibility that consenting sexual partners 
may be required to register as sex offenders for sharing nude 
photographs with each other may also rightfully seem outrageous.  
Most scholarship on sexting and the law has registered this 
outrage.59 
Applied to sexting cases, child pornography laws are described 
as “a blunt instrument, which has created unintended 
consequences,”60 and an “ill fit” for the act of sexting.61  These 
cases raise a number of critical questions concerning the 
constitutionality of prosecuting minors who produce and 
disseminate “self-produced sexually explicit images” and the best 
way to respond to children who engage in sexting, if these can 
even be considered child pornography cases.62  Most of the 
criticism about sexting cases, though, comes from doubts about the 
harm against which child pornography laws are trying to protect. 
 
 54 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 55 Id. at 235. 
 56 Id. (“The State alleged that, while the photos were never shown to a third party, 
A.H. and J.G.W. emailed the photos to another computer from A.H.’s home.”).  
 57 Id. (“A.H. and J.G.W. were each charged with one count of producing, directing or 
promoting a photograph or representation that they knew to include the sexual conduct of 
a child, in violation of section 827.071(3), Florida Statutes.”). 
 58 See Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 39. 
 59 See Leary, supra note 8, at 45–48. 
 60 Joanna L. Barry, The Child as Victim and Perpetrator: Laws Punishing Juvenile 
“Sexting”, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 129, 140 (2010). 
 61 McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 171. 
 62 Wastler, supra note 3, at 691. 
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Existing scholarship mostly considers the harm in sexting as 
mismatched with the harm of child pornography.63  Broadly, there 
are two positions on juvenile sexting as child pornography.64  
Compared with “true child pornography,”65 sexting is seen as a 
“less sinister activity”66 that does not reach the same level of 
exploitation or potential abuse.67  In this view, when sexted images 
are not coerced, the immediate “psychological, physical, and 
emotional harm” to a child “that is the foundation of the child 
protection rationale is decidedly absent.”68  The scholars in this 
position believe that the law is intended to protect against child 
abuse stemming from the production of child pornography in 
particular.69  So, even if there is eventual harm from the circulation 
of the image or later embarrassment, sexting itself does not cause 
the sort of harm against which the law protects because it was done 
 
 63 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 137 (arguing that “[o]ur existing law is indeed a 
blunt instrument because it fails to distinguish between teen sexting images and true child 
pornography”); Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (arguing that “[a]n adolescent taking nude 
or scantily clad photos of themselves or recording their consensual encounters does not 
suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and emotional harm of the kind suffered by 
child sexual abuse victims”). See generally Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 33 (arguing 
that using child pornography statutes to punish sexting teens “goes beyond the 
contemplated purpose and intent of those laws”). 
 64 See Wastler, supra note 3, at 687–88. 
 65 Hiffa, supra note 13, at 515. 
 66 Barry, supra note 60, at 140. 
 67 See Hiffa, supra note 13, at 515.  
 68 Wastler, supra note 3, at 698. 
 69 See, e.g., Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 242 (arguing that among the 
five reasons cited for the exclusion of child pornography from constitutional protection, 
the main thrust of Ferber is that “[c]hild pornography must be prohibited because of the 
harm done to children in its production.”); Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 34 (“The 
purpose of child pornography statutes is to shield children from the abuse that occurs in 
the production of the photo.”).  In Arcabascio’s estimation, the “critical issues always has 
been ‘whether a child has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of 
the work.’” Id. at para. 36 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 761 (1982)).  
Pointing to the decision in Free Speech Coalition, Arcabascio concludes that “a charge of 
child pornography requires a proximate link to a crime, i.e. the child abuse in the 
production of the pornographic image,” noting that where “no crime occurs in the taking 
of the picture, the distribution argument cannot stand alone and must fail.” Id. at para. 37.  
This leads Arcabascio to conclude that, when done voluntarily and consensually, “the 
exchange of nude photography [by minors] should not be considered exploitation or child 
abuse,” and that the children involved “should not be treated as a disseminator of child 
pornography and . . . should not be prosecuted as a possessor of child pornography.” Id. 
at para. 39.  
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consensually, ostensibly avoiding any abuse related to the 
production of the child pornography or sexted images.70 
Alternatively, others scholars argue that there is no harm from 
sexting at all.71  If no harm is perceived, prosecuting teen sexters 
under child pornography laws logically seems unreasonable.72  If 
child pornography laws are intended to “protect children from the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health trauma associated with 
the creation and distribution of the material,”73 the argument goes 
that innocuous sexting should not be prosecuted as child 
 
 70 Whereas some scholars fail to find any harm from voluntary, consensual sexting, 
even when done by minors, others consider the possibility that all pornography may be 
harmful if viewed by a child, not because of abuse or the inducement of bad conduct, but 
as moral harm. See Andrew Koppelman, Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1635, 1654 (2005) (suggesting that adults, too, are subject to harms 
stemming from obscene pornographic material as well). 
 71 See, e.g., Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (“Sexting should be considered outside the 
scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images, like virtual child 
pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” explaining that a teenager who 
sexts “does not  suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and emotional harm of the 
kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims.”); Walster argues that “[s]exting should be 
considered outside the scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images, 
like virtual child pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” explaining that 
a teenager who sexts “does not suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and 
emotional harm of the kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims.” Id. at 698. See, e.g., 
Sherman, supra note 8, at 145 (explaining that in the case with the New Jersey girl, 
“technically no harm or exploitation of a minor occurred”); Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell 
Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When Children Become Child 
Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 
27 (2009) (“For instance, if a fourteen year-old girl snaps a picture of herself posing 
naked and lying on her own bed while alone in her own bedroom, she likely is not 
suffering either physical abuse or emotional abuse when the image is being captured.”).  
By describing the fourteen year-old girl as “likely” not suffering abuse and the New 
Jersey girl as “technically” unharmed, these scholars deny the harm stemming from 
sexting while concurrently opening up the possibility of such harm to exist.  Instead of 
leaving the “technical” and the “possible” unexplored, the next part of this article, infra, 
analyzes the connection between self-produced child pornography and psychosexual 
harm by turning to Freud.  
 72 See Clay Calvert, Sex, Cell Phones, Privacy, and the First Amendment: When 
Children Become Child Pornographers and the Lolita Effect Undermines the Law, 18 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 1, 46 (2009) (“For instance, if a fourteen-year-old-girl snaps a 
picture of herself posing naked and lying on her own bed while alone in her own 
bedroom, she likely is not suffering either physical abuse or emotional abuse when the 
image is being captured.”). 
 73 McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174. 
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pornography.74  Recognizing that juveniles are the “vulnerable 
class” that the laws were meant to protect from sexual abuse,75 
many detect a “profound and troubling irony” when minors are 
prosecuted for violating child pornography statutes for sexting.76  
Some even believe that punishing juvenile sexters with violating 
child pornography laws could “ultimately cause a lifetime of 
harm” worse than any harm derived from the sexting itself.77  
Mismatched from the harm of sexting, child pornography law is 
thus widely considered unreasonable when applied to cases like 
those in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Florida. 
The very idea of self-produced child pornography rightly raises 
a number of questions about exactly what harm stems from child 
pornography.  How are judges rationalizing their decisions to 
punish the victims the law intends to protect?  Reinterpreting 
sexting cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s 1905 Three Essays on 
the Theory of Sexuality offers a surprising explanation for the 
motivation to charge juvenile victims as perpetrators of self-
produced child pornography: many judges fear that juvenile 
sexting will jeopardize the development of a normal sexual life for 
the children involved—including both those who send and those 
who receive sexted images—and, as a result, compromise society 
as a whole.78  This is precisely Freud’s concern. 
II. FREUD’S THEORY OF SEXUALITY 
A. Psychosexual Development 
Freud envisioned psychosexual development as a narrow 
course besieged by perversion-inducing perils: “[e]very step on 
this long path of development can become a point of fixation . . . 
 
 74 See id. at 179 (arguing that the law never intended to encompass sexting because it 
only intended to prohibit activities resulting in harm).   
 75 Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Juveniles were not the intended targets of these laws; 
rather, they were the vulnerable class that legislators intended to protect.”). 
 76 Calvert, supra note 71, at 60. 
 77 Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 33. 
 78 See Koppelman, supra note 70, at 1653–54. 
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can be an occasion for a dissociation of the sexual instinct . . . .”79  
Numerous factors, from an excess of parental affection to 
premature exposure to sexual objects, affect the path’s successful 
navigation where even minimal straying could result in grave 
danger.80  For in the end, the “play of influences which govern the 
evolution of infantile sexuality” result in its “outcome in 
perversion, neurosis or normal sexual life.”81  Recently, judges and 
prosecutors across jurisdictions appear to be trying to control a 
new influence on the path of children’s’ psychosexual 
development: sexting. 
According to Freud’s theory, a child’s psychosexual 
development is diphasic, divided by a period of latency.82  The first 
phase encompasses the oral, anal, and phallic stages in which an 
infant pursues and satisfies his or her libido.83  In the phallic stage, 
children finally become aware of their own and others’ bodies.84  
By undressing themselves, investigating their genitals, and 
similarly exploring each other, children gratify their curiosity, 
learning the sexual differences between male and female.85  Freud 
notes that “children are essentially without shame” and “show an 
 
 79 SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 101 (James Strachey 
ed. & trans., Basic Books 2000) (1905) [hereinafter THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF 
SEXUALITY]. 
 80 See id. at 89, 94.  Parental affection, and in particular maternal affection, is 
described by Freud as a sexual act: the mother “regards [the child] with feelings that are 
derived from her own sexual life: she strokes him, kisses him, rocks him and quite clearly 
treats him as a substitute for a complete sexual object.” Id. at 89.  This act, however, 
instructs the child how to love, ensuring that the child “grow up into a strong and capable 
person with vigorous sexual needs and to accomplish during his life all the things that 
human beings are urged to do by their instincts.” Id.  Like seduction, however, timing and 
degree are important factors.  Freud explains that “an excess of parental affection does 
harm by causing precocious sexual maturity and also because, by spoiling the child, it 
makes him incapable in later life of temporarily doing without love or of being content 
with a smaller amount of it.” Id. 
 81 Id. at 38. 
 82 See id. at 42. 
 83 See id. at 49–55. 
 84 See id. at 58 (“Small children whose attention has once been drawn—as a rule by 
masturbation—to their own genitals usually . . . develop a lively interest in the genitals of 
their playmates.”). 
 85 See id.  For more on the castration complex and penis envy, see id. at 61. 
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unmistakable satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial 
emphasis on the sexual parts.”86 
Between the first phase of childhood sexuality and the onset of 
the second phase with adolescence, sexual development enters a 
period of relative stability.87  In this period, sexual feelings are 
dormant and no new organization of sexuality develops.88  Freud 
names this the “latency period” and describes its main feature as 
the deferment of the reproductive functions.89  The latency period 
thus represents a pause in the development of sexuality.90  
Nevertheless, the period is characterized by much activity.91  
Sexual instinctual forces are still present, but are diverted and 
directed into other areas, making this stage crucial not just to the 
child’s future sexuality, but also to society as a whole.92  Many 
important developments occur in the latency period due to the 
diversion of sexual energy, including the dissolution of the 
Oedipus complex,93 the construction of mental dams,94 and, most 
importantly, the formation of the super-ego.95 
 
 86 Id. at 58. 
 87 See id. at 42–44. 
 88 See id. at 43. 
 89 See id. at 44.  
 90 See id. According to Freud, this process “deserves the name ‘sublimation.’” Id.  (“It 
is possible further to form some idea of the mechanism of this process of sublimation. 
One the one hand, it would seem, the sexual impulses cannot be utilized during these 
years of childhood, since the reproductive functions have been deferred—a fact which 
constitutes the main feature of the period of latency.”) Id.  
 91 See id. (“Thus the activity of those impulses does not cease even during this period 
of latency, though their energy is diverted, wholly or in great part, from their sexual use 
and directed to other ends.”). 
 92 See id. (“Historians of civilization appear to be at one in assuming that powerful 
components are acquired for every kind of cultural achievement by this diversion of 
sexual instinctual forces from sexual aims and their direction to new ones . . . .”). 
 93 See SIGMUND FREUD, The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, in 19 THE STANDARD 
EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 173, 173 (James 
Strachey ed. & trans. 1961) [hereinafter The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex] 
(“[Oedipal] dissolution takes place; it succumbs to repression . . . and is followed by the 
latency period.”). 
 94 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 178 (discussing 
the building up of mental dams, namely, disgust, shame, and morality, during the latency 
period). 
 95 See SIGMUND FREUD, The Ego and the Id, in 19 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE 
COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 12, 34 (James Strachey ed. & 
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The start of the latency period marks the dissolution of the 
Oedipus complex, causing the child to realize that his or her desire 
for the parent of the opposite sex cannot be fulfilled.96  
Consequently, during “the period of latency children learn to feel 
for other people who help them in their helplessness and satisfy 
their needs a love which is on the model of . . . their relation as 
sucklings to their nursing mother.”97  Turning away from the 
oedipal wish and searching for love,98 the child begins to identify 
with the parent of the same sex,99 finally transferring the libido 
interest from parents to friends100 and activities.101  Children thus 
devote the energy previously put into the oedipal problem into 
developing themselves, including tempering their primitive drives 
with what Freud names “mental forces.”102 
These forces include “disgust, feelings of shame and the claims 
of aesthetic and moral ideals.”103  According to Freud’s model, 
mental forces are “built up” during latency “which are later to 
impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like dams, restrict its 
flow.”104  Because these forces restrain the instinct “within the 
limits that are regarded as normal,” Freud considers the struggle of 
the sexual instinct against the mental dams a necessary component 
of developing a healthy sexual life.105  If the mental dams fail to 
 
trans. 1961) [hereinafter The Ego and the Id] (“[T]he ego ideal [or super-ego] had the 
task of repressing the Oedipus complex.”). 
 96 See The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, supra note 93, at 173. 
 97 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 88–89. 
 98 See id. at 88. 
 99 See The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex, supra note 93, at 175–76. 
 100 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 91, 95, 98. 
 101 See id. at 44. 
 102 See id. at 43–44 (“It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built 
up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like 
dams, restrict its flow—disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral 
ideals.  One gets an impression from civilized children that the construction of these 
dams is a product of education, and no doubt education has much to do with it.  But in 
reality this development is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can 
occasionally occur without any help at all from education.  Education will not be 
trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits itself to following the lines which 
have already been laid down organically and to impressing them somewhat more clearly 
and deeply.”).  
 103 Id. at 43. 
 104 Id.  
 105 Id. at 28. 
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adequately provide resistances, little will keep the sexual drives on 
the narrow path to normalcy.106  As an example, Freud explains 
that “the force which opposes scopophilia [the love of looking] . . .  
is shame.”107  By feeling shame for what they are doing when they 
look at others, children are able to overpower the perverse force of 
scopophilia and remain securely on the path to healthy sexuality.108  
In this way, learned feelings in the form of mental dams act as a 
powerful weapon against perversions and thereby “protect” 
children from unhealthy sexual deviancy.109 
Despite their importance, these perversion-prophylactics are 
developed only in latency.110  For Freud it is therefore essential 
that the latency period lasts long enough for all of the necessary 
dams to be constructed and for psychosexual tasks to be 
accomplished before the sex drive can safely function.111  “[B]y 
the postponing of sexual maturation,” Freud explains, “time has 
been gained in which the child can erect . . . restraints on 
sexuality . . . .”112  Notably, during this period, children also “take 
up into [themselves] the moral precepts” that are made by 
society.113 
Accordingly, a principal task of the latency period is the 
construction of the super-ego.114  In The Ego and the Id, Freud 
describes the super-ego as the outcome of “two highly important 
factors,” one of which is the “interruption of libidinal development 
 
 106 See id. 
 107 Id. at 23. 
 108 See id. at 23, 28. 
 109 See id. at 17 (“Those who condemn [use of the mouth as a sexual organ] . . . as 
being [a] perversion[], are giving way to an unmistakable feeling of disgust, which 
protects them from accepting sexual aims of the kind.”). 
 110 See id. at 43–44 (“It is during this period of total or only partial latency that are built 
up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like 
dams, restrict its flow—disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral 
ideals.”); see also id. at 28 (“Our study of the perversions has shown us that the sexual 
instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of 
which shame and disgust are the most prominent.”). 
 111 See id. at 91. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 35. 
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by the latency period.”115  During this time, the super-ego is 
differentiated from the ego.116  The super-ego, comprising the 
organized part of the personality structure, criticizes and prohibits 
one’s drives, feelings, fantasies, and actions.117  Described as “the 
representative . . . of every moral restriction,” and “the 
advocate . . . striving towards perfection,” the super-ego is “the 
higher side of human life.”118  Under this theory, civilizing 
constructions emerge at the cost of the infantile sexual impulses: 
“[h]istorians of civilization appear to be at one in assuming that 
powerful components are acquired for every kind of cultural 
achievement by this diversion of sexual instinctual forces from 
sexual aims and their direction to new ones.”119  In short, the 
latency period “appears to be one of the necessary conditions of 
the aptitude of men for developing a higher civilization . . . .”120  
The stakes of the latency period are consequently high.  For the 
individual, what is learned or not learned “is of the highest 
importance in regard to disturbances of [the] final outcome” of 
sexual life.121  And, on a larger cultural level, maintaining the 
latency period is essential to society as a whole.122 
B. Seduction and the Harm of Sexual Precocity 
In addition to constructing mental dams and forming the super-
ego, staying on the path of normal sexual development during 
latency also involves avoiding harmful biological and social 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 See id. at 34. 
 117 See id. (“[The super-ego] also comprises the prohibition: ‘You may not be like this 
(like your father)—that is, you may not do all that he does; some things are his 
prerogative.’”). 
 118 SIGMUND FREUD, Lecture XXXI: The Dissection of the Psychical Personality, in 22 
THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 
57, 67 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1964); accord The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 
36 (“[W]e can say, ‘and here we have that higher nature, in this ego ideal or super-ego . . 
. .’”). 
 119 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 44. 
 120 Id at 100. 
 121 Id. at 66. 
 122 See id. at 91.  After the latency period, the second wave of sexuality sets in and 
determines, based on the mental dams and super-ego developed in the latency period, if 
the child “is to remain healthy, and the symptomatology of his neurosis, if he is to fall ill 
after puberty.” Id. at 55. 
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pitfalls to maintain the proper “play of influences”123 governing the 
evolution of infantile sexuality.124  One such influence is “sexual 
precocity,” which is “manifested in the interruption, abbreviation 
or bringing to an end of the infantile period of latency.”125  
Interrupting the latency period is “a cause of disturbances” because 
it occasions “sexual manifestations which, owing on the one hand 
to the sexual inhibitions being incomplete and on the other hand to 
the genital system being undeveloped, are bound to be in the nature 
of perversions.”126  Consequently, “sexual precocity makes more 
difficult the later control of the sexual instinct by the higher mental 
agencies.”127  The source of this harmful precocity, according to 
Freud, is “first and foremost, seduction by other children or by 
adults.”128 
According to Freud, seduction can take two forms.  The first 
kind of seduction “treats a child as a sexual object prematurely,”129 
before the requisite mental dams are in place to help restrain and 
divert libidinal energy to society-building and self-building 
tasks.130  Seduction can also take the form of presenting a child 
“prematurely with a sexual object for which the infantile sexual 
instinct at first shows no need.”131  In either case, seduction has the 
same devastating effects on the child.132 
 
 123 Id. at 38. 
 124 See id. at 106–07. 
 125 Id. at 106.   
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 108.  For more about seduction generally, see SIGMUND FREUD, Further 
Remarks on the Neuro-Psychoses of Defence, in 3 STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE 
PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD, 157, 168–69, 168 n.1 (James Strachey ed. & 
trans. 1962) (explaining that Freud might have over-stated the prominence of seduction, 
but still says that its harm is real). 
 129 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 56. 
 130  See id. at 57 (“[A]n aptitude for [sexual irregularities] is innately present in their 
disposition. There is consequently little resistance towards carrying them out, since the 
mental dams against sexual excesses—shame, disgust and morality—have either not yet 
been constructed at all or are only in course of construction, according to the age of the 
child.”). 
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. (“[U]nder the influence of seduction children can become polymorphously 
perverse, and can be led into all possible kinds of sexual irregularities.”). 
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Freud is explicit about the negative impacts and dangers of 
seduction: “[e]xperience further showed that the external 
influences of seduction are capable of provoking interruptions of 
the latency period or even its cessation.”133  As a result, under the 
influence of seduction, children “can be led into all possible kinds 
of sexual irregularities.”134  This is in part because the dams 
guarding against unhealthy sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and 
morality—have not yet been constructed or are only in the process 
of construction, depending on the age of the child.135  Moreover, 
“any such premature sexual activity diminishes a child’s 
educability.”136  Seduction, therefore, reinforces its harmfulness, 
by both interrupting the important tasks of latency that inform a 
child how to behave and by making education more difficult. 
While it is possible for internal causes to spontaneously arouse 
a child’s sexual life, Freud repeatedly notes that “an influence [like 
seduction] may originate either from adults or from other 
children.”137  Significantly, adults are not the only dangerous 
actors; children can also seduce themselves and each other by 
prematurely treating each other as sexual objects or by prematurely 
presenting each other with sexual objects.138 
Given the importance of the latency period, Freud holds sexual 
precocity through seduction as invariably dangerous.139  By 
interrupting latency, seduction results in the development of 
perversions, and, if widespread, seduction could also compromise 
higher civilization itself.140  To guarantee normal psychosexual 
development, before children are exposed to sexual objects—or are 
treated like sexual objects—it is therefore essential to postpone 
sexual maturation long enough to ensure the complete construction 
of mental dams and the super super-ego.141  Besides protecting 
latency, this process can be additionally aided “with the assistance 
 
 133 Id. at 100. 
 134 Id. at 57. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Id. at 100.   
 137 Id. at 56.   
 138 See id. at 57. 
 139 See id. at 106–107. 
 140 See id. at 58. 
 141 See id. at 57. 
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of education.”142  Although Freud explains that this psychosexual 
development is “organically determined and fixed by heredity,” he 
admits that “education has much to do with . . . the construction of 
these dams.”143  This is precisely what the court appears to be 
doing in the contested sexting cases: extending the latency period, 
postponing sexual maturation, and aiding in the construction of 
dams, by prohibiting sexting as harmful seduction. 
III. COURTS’ FREUDIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
DAMAGE OF SEXTING 
A. Sexting as Seduction 
Subjecting the law to a Freudian analysis reveals the parallel 
between the anxiety of judges and prosecutors about sexting and 
the harm of seduction.  In many cases, judges characterize children 
as inhabiting the latency period.144  Accordingly, any sexual 
activity undertaken during this period is tantamount to sexual 
precocity,145 which includes sexting.  Many courts, in short, are 
subconsciously trying to protect children from sexting as a form of 
Freudian seduction.146 
Many jurisdictions even think about children in the same terms 
as Freud.  Juvenile sexting is regularly described as a “lapse in 
good judgment,” highlighting the belief that teenage sexters are 
immature and not yet equipped to contend with sexual subjects.147  
As the decision in A.H. v. State clarified, the “appellant was simply 
too young to make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual 
conduct and memorializing it.  Mere production of these videos or 
pictures may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers 
 
 142 Id. at 98.   
 143 Id. at 43–44.   
 144 See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238–39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 145 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 106. 
 146 Similarly, scholars have connected sexting with psychosexual development. See, 
e.g., Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Sexting is the newest expression of teenagers’ urge to 
examine their developing sexual identity . . . .”).  But to date no legal study has connected 
sexting with Freud’s theory to shed new light on the law’s motivation in charging 
children with violating child pornography statutes.  
 147 See, e.g., Hiffa, supra note 13, at 530.  
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involved.”148  Yet, the production of sexually explicit images may 
also later prove embarrassing for adults, causing similar 
psychological damage.149  But whereas the court is unconcerned 
with the effects of sexting on adults, the relative youth of teenage 
sexters renders the same consensual behavior especially 
injurious.150  Note, also, that the explicit concern is not with 
circulation, but with “[m]ere production.”151  The act itself, when 
performed by a teenager, is somehow especially dangerous due to 
the youth of the sexter.152 
When discussing teenagers’ poor judgment and the delayed 
onset of shame for sending lascivious pictures of themselves, 
judges effectively treat juvenile-sexters as if they are still busy 
navigating Freud’s dangerous path of sexual development.  In 
many sexting cases, the depicted child is later reported to feel 
“great amounts of shame . . . because of their involvement in the 
production” of the self-produced pornographic images.153  Notably, 
shame is felt only after children who sext have willingly taken and 
distributed lascivious pictures of themselves.154  More fully 
developed feelings of shame, therefore, might have prevented the 
sexting. 
 
 148 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 238–39. 
 149 See id. at 239. 
 150 See id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 See id. 
 153 Shannon Shafron-Perez, Average Teenager or Sex Offender? Solutions to the Legal 
Dilemma Caused by Sexting, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 431, 448 (2009).  
Shafron-Perez goes on to describe how teenagers who voluntarily self-produce sexually 
explicit images of themselves are later “tortured by internal shame and regret” Id. at 449; 
see also Leary, supra note 8, at 11 (“Regarding the perpetuity of the crime, Congress 
noted that, ‘where children are used in its production, child pornography permanently 
records the victim’s abuse, and [the images’] continued existence causes the child victims 
. . . continuing harm by haunting those children in future years.’” (quoting Child 
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121.1(2), 110 Stat. 3009 
(1996))); Mimi Halper Silbert, The Effects on Juveniles of Being Used for Pornography 
and Prostitution, in PORNOGRAPHY: RESEARCH ADVANCES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
215, 226 (Dolf Zillman & Jennings Bryant eds., 1989) (“The long-term impact of 
participating in pornography appears to be even more debilitating than the immediate 
effects.”).  
 154 See Shafron-Perez, supra note 153, at 449. 
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Freud’s theory offers an explanation for this phenomenon: as 
one of the mental dams governing sexuality, shame develops 
during latency.155  Without this dam fully constructed, the juvenile 
“satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial emphasis on 
the sexual parts,” as Freud described it, may win out, especially if 
the teenager who practices sexting is still in latency.156 
Children’s motivation for sexting also indicates occupation of 
the latency period between the two phases of sexual 
development.157  Recent studies suggest that many teenagers 
engage in sexting to satisfy their desire for love and acceptance,158 
another feature of Freud’s latency period.159  After the dissolution 
of the Oedipus complex, children seek out new forms of love.160  
Normally, this takes the form of non-sexual activities, like 
pursuing hobbies,161 unless children are seduced and prematurely 
exposed to sexual objects.162  Described as love-seeking163 and 
immature,164 juveniles who engage in sexting are routinely 
characterized as if they are in a period of latency, when children 
should be building mental dams and constructing super-egos, and 
specifically when exposure to sexual subjects is particularly 
harmful.165 
 
 155 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 43. 
 156 Id. at 58. 
 157 See Barry, supra note 60, at 133 (“Teenagers have turned to ‘sexts’ as [a] new form 
of expression of their urges to examine their developing sexual identity.”); see also 
Dahlia Lithwick, Teens, Nude Photos and the Law, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 23, 2009, 
http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/13/teens-nude-photos-and-the-law.html (“[T]he 
great majority of these kids . . . think they’re being brash and sexy.”); Wendy Koch, 
Teens Caught ‘Sexting’ Face Porn Charges, USA TODAY, Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/wireless/2009-03-11-sexting_N.htm (explaining that kids 
engaged in sexting often do not know that it is a crime). See generally THREE ESSAYS ON 
THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 66. 
 158 See Jamie L. Williams, Teens, Sexts, & Cyberspace: The Constitutional Implications 
of Current Sexting & Cyberbullying Laws, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1017, 1027–28 
(2012). 
 159 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 88. 
 160 See id. at 88, 95. 
 161 See id. at 44. 
 162 See id. at 44, 100. 
 163 See Williams, supra note 158, at 1028–29. 
 164 A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 165 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 178. 
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Sexting, like seduction, also takes two forms.  The child who 
takes a lascivious picture of him- or herself is treated prematurely 
as a sexual object.166  Correspondingly, the juvenile recipient of the 
sexted image is presented prematurely with a sexual object.167  
Analogous to Freud’s theory, children are punished for both 
sending sexually explicit images of themselves and for possessing 
sexually explicit images of other children.168  In A.H. v. State, for 
example, the sixteen year-old defendant was punished for 
producing and disseminating child pornography and the recipient 
of the sexted images, her seventeen year-old boyfriend, was 
charged with possession of child pornography.169 
In addition to paralleling seduction by prematurely exposing 
juveniles to sex, the harm from sexting also derives from the same 
perpetrators as seduction in Freud’s theory.  In sexting cases, 
courts have recently recognized that children can harm other 
children.170  In February 2011, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Kentucky noted in Clark v. Roccanova that 
child pornography laws do not distinguish between adults and 
children: “there is nothing in the legislative history which would 
indicate Congress intended ‘person’ to mean an adult,” further 
clarifying that “Congress refers only to ‘persons’ and does not 
narrow the term to adults.”171 
 
 166 See Williams, supra note 158, at 1028. 
 167 See id. 
 168 Depending on the jurisdiction, different acts, including sending and receiving are 
penalized differently.  For example, a current bill under consideration in the Hawaiian 
state senate makes it an “affirmative defense . . . [if] the person took reasonable steps to 
destroy or eliminate the nude photograph or video of a minor.” S.B. 2222, 26th Leg. 
(Haw. 2012). 
 169 See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235. 
 170 See United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 919 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
preventative measures taken against the “use of pornographic depictions of children in 
the seduction or coercion of other children into sexual activity”); see also Osborne v. 
Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990); United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 750 (3d Cir. 1994).  
One kind of harm stemming from children is obvious, as in the case of Jessica Logan. See 
generally Logan v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 780 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D. Ohio 
2011) (discussing the harassment and subsequent suicide of Jessica Logan stemming 
from a nude sext of her from the neck down). 
 171 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011).  The opinion goes on to explain that “the 
legislative history of [18 U.S.C. § 2252] states that the ‘Committee on Human Resources 
has a deep and abiding concern for the health and welfare of the children and the youth of 
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In Clark v. Roccanova, the harm of children seducing each 
other is readily apparent: here, a group of fourteen year-olds 
successfully persuaded fourteen year-old Clark to self-produce a 
sexually explicit video of herself.172  After the defendants 
subsequently transmitted the video over the Internet, the persuasive 
group of teenagers were charged with violating federal child 
pornography laws.173  In 2010, a similar case occurred in 
Wisconsin, where a nineteen year-old boy was convicted of two 
counts of sexual abuse of a child after he used Facebook to 
convince more than thirty of his male classmates to send him 
naked pictures of themselves, whom he subsequently blackmailed 
into performing sexual acts.174  In these cases, by treating other 
children as sexual objects, teenagers caused considerable harm, 
equivalent to Freud’s conception of seduction. 
In the most extreme cases, the danger of children seducing 
each other, in a Freudian sense, is even greater, and has even 
resulted in the tragic suicides of the children depicted in the sexted 
images.  For instance, in Logan v. Sycamore County School Board 
of Education, a teenage girl committed suicide after enduring 
months of cyberbullying for sending a nude photograph of herself 
to her former boyfriend, who subsequently distributed the 
picture.175 
 
America,’ and therefore ‘condemns such base and sordid activities which may 
permanently traumatize and warp the minds of the children involved.’” Id. (quoting S. 
REP. NO. 95-438, at 3 (1977)).  The court concludes that “[e]ncounters which produce 
child pornography ‘cannot help but have a deep psychological, humiliating impact on 
these youngsters and jeopardize the possibility of healthy, affectionate relationships in the 
future.’” Id. 
 172 See id. at 846–47. 
 173 See id. at 847. 
 174 See Laurel Walker, Stancl Gets 15 Years in Prison in Facebook Coercion Case, 
MILWAUKEE WISCONSIN JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.jsonline.com/ 
news/waukesha/85252392.html (explaining that the New Berlin High School student then 
used the images to “blackmail at least seven boys, ages 15 to 17, into performing sex 
acts”). 
 175 See Logan, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 595.  After sending a nude photograph of herself to 
her former boyfriend’s cell phone at his urging, Jessica Logan endured months of cyber 
bullying as the picture was quickly distributed to cell phones in several area high schools 
and eventually committed suicide. Id.  For a closer examination of the case and its 
relation to cyber bullying, see generally Kathleen Conn, Allegations of School District 
Liability for Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Teen Suicides After Sexting: Are New Legal 
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But many courts are concerned with more than just the most 
egregious cases.  Across the country, judges are fearful of even 
consensual and private sexual acts between children as they relate 
to sexting.176  In A.H. v. State, for instance, the sexted image was 
shared only between consenting sex partners.177  Nevertheless, the 
lack of circulation proved inconsequential.178  Children, it seems, 
can also hurt themselves, by exposing themselves and treating 
themselves as sexual objects prematurely.179 
Regardless of whether from an adult, another child, or the child 
him- or herself, the harm is the same.  In Clark v. Roccanova the 
 
Standards Emerging  in the Courts?, 37 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 227 
(2011).  
 176 See, e.g., A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).  Of course, 
the Supreme Court has long recognized the government’s compelling interest in 
protecting children from harm. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); 
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 
629, 640 (1968).  And, as established in Ferber, this compelling interest has created a 
remarkable exception in First Amendment jurisprudence to prevent the abuse of children 
stemming from child pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 760–62 
(1982); see also United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 918–19 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
CPPA was designed by Congress to serve all of these interests . . . (1) to prevent the use 
of virtual child pornography to stimulate the sexual appetites of pedophiles and child 
sexual abusers; (2) to destroy the network and market for child pornography; (3) to 
prevent the use of pornographic depictions of children in the seduction or coercion of 
other children into sexual activity; (4) to solve the problem of prosecution in those cases 
where the government cannot call as a witness or otherwise identify the child involved to 
establish his/her age; (5) to prevent harm to actual children involved, where child 
pornography serves as a lasting record of their abuse; and (6) to prevent harm to children 
caused by the sexualization and eroticization of minors in child pornography.”). 
 177 See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235. 
 178 See id. at 238–39. The dissent held a different view:  
[t]he critical point in this case is that the child intended to keep the 
photographs private. She did not attempt to exploit  anyone or to 
embarrass anyone. I think her expectation of privacy in the 
photographs was reasonable. Certainly, an argument could be made 
that she was foolish to expect that, but the expectation of a sixteen 
year old cannot be measured by the collective wisdom of appellate 
judges who have no emotional connection to the event. Perhaps if the 
child had as much time to reflect on these events, she would have 
eventually concluded, as the majority did, that there were ways in 
which these photos might have been unintentionally disclosed. That 
does not make her expectation of privacy unreasonable. 
Id. at 240–41 (Padovano, J., dissenting). 
 179 See id. at 237–38. 
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court was explicit about this point, holding that “[n]othing in the 
record indicates that a child would be less traumatized if that 
pornography is created or transmitted by a child rather than an 
adult.”180  Like the reasoning in Clark, noting that “[n]othing in the 
jurisprudence indicates that such harm could be done only by adult 
perpetrators,”181 the dicta in A.H. v. State reads like a passage out 
of Freud, who attributes the harms of sexual precocity to 
“seduction by other children or by adults.”182 
Even the ways in which courts and state legislatures are 
choosing to punish teenage sexting resemble Freud’s 1905 theory 
of sexuality, further substantiating the notion that sexting is 
injurious seduction.  Both judicial and legislative responses to 
sexting suggest that teenagers who engage in sexting need 
additional sex education, indicating that the children involved have 
more to learn before they are ready to be exposed to sexual objects 
or are treated as sexual objects.183  In A.H. v State the trial court 
found that “[p]rosecution [under child pornography statutes] 
enables the State to prevent future illegal, exploitative acts by 
supervising and providing any necessary counseling to the 
child.”184 
This objective was made even clearer in Miller v. 
Skumanick.185  Here, the district attorney “promised that the 
charges would be dropped if the child successfully completed a 
six- to nine-month program focused on education and 
 
 180 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (interpreting the legislative history of the 
Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 
Stat. 7 (1978)). 
 181 Id. 
 182 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 108. 
 183 See, e.g., A.H., 949 So. 2d at 238–39 (stating that the “[a]ppellant was simply too 
young to make an intelligent decision about engaging in sexual conduct and 
memorializing it” and that even the production of the images can result in psychological 
trauma for the children involved); see also Assemb. 1560, 214th Leg., 2010 Sess. (N.J. 
2010) (proposing a law that would require school districts to annually disseminate 
information, including a description of the practice and its legal, psychological, and 
sociological implications, to students and parents or guardians on the dangers of 
distributing sexually explicit images through electronic means). 
 184 A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236. 
 185 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009). 
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counseling.”186  The proposed course, called a “re-education 
program” was “designed to teach the girls to ‘gain an 
understanding of how their actions were wrong,’ [and] ‘gain an 
understanding of what it means to be a girl in today’s society, both 
advantages and disadvantages.’”187  The program even included 
homework, including assignments about why sexting is 
“wrong.”188  Although the teenagers won their case in Mitchell,189 
successfully arguing that threatening prosecution to force students 
into the education program violated their Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process rights,190 many states today have 
developed similar counseling programs as the preferred 
punishment for sexting.191  Currently, bills under consideration in 
 
 186 Id. at 638. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010).  Whereas Miller v. Skumanick was 
the case name in the District Court, Miller v. Mitchell was the name of the case when 
heard by the Court of Appeals. 
 190 See id. at 150–51.  The students and parents in Skumanick filed suit Civil Rights Act 
section 1983 complaint against Skumanick, alleging that the threat of prosecution for not 
participating in the educational program violated their First Amendment rights to free 
expression and freedom from compelled expression. See Verified Complaint at para. 62–
65, Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (2009) (No. 09CV00540).  The parents 
additionally alleged violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to direct their 
children’s upbringing. See id. at para. 66. 
 191 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 321, Cal. Leg., 2011–12 Sess. (Cal. 2011) (punishing teenage 
sexting with counseling); H.B. 4483, 80th Leg., 2nd Sess. (W. Va. 2012) (aiming to 
create an “educational diversion program”).  In fact, in 2012, thirteen states considered 
legislation aimed at sexting, many of the bills and resolutions aimed at creating 
educational counseling programs, and four states—Hawaii, New York, Pennsylvania and 
South Dakota—passed such bills. See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-
legislation-2012.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2013).  The legislative response, on the state 
level, has had an upward trend.  Each year, more states consider resolutions addressing 
juvenile sexting.  In 2009, twelve states considered legislation addressing sexting. See 
2009 “Sexting” Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http:// 
www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2009.aspx (last visited 
November 16, 2012).  The following year, no fewer than sixteen states considered bills 
dealing with sexting. See 2010 Legislation Related to “Sexting”, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2010.aspx (last visited November 16, 2012).  
In 2011, twenty-one states introduced legislation addressing sexting. See 2011 
Legislation Related to “Sexting”, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2011.aspx (last visited 
November 16, 2012).  For an overview of the variety of legislative responses, see Lewin, 
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the New York, South Carolina, and Texas legislatures would create 
educational programs for juveniles convicted of sexting.192 
If legislatures and judges across the country believe that 
children who engage in sexting need additional education, these 
legal actors must correspondingly believe that juveniles are not 
fully educated about sexuality; that they do not have the proper 
maturity to deal with sexting and therefore cannot exercise good 
judgment.193  In light of the uniformity of the response across legal 
domains, the law seems to believe that teenagers could easily stray 
from the narrow path of normal sexual development by sexting, 
and, as Freud says, “be led into all possible kinds of sexual 
irregularities.”194  This belief reinforces the notion that children are 
not yet through latency, but have additional mental dams to 
construct, such as shame. 
The latest punishment for sexting may even be supported by 
Freud.  After all, Freud suggested postponing sexual maturation to 
 
supra note 25 and Jan Hoffman, States Struggle With Minors’ Sexting, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/27/us/ 27sextinglaw.html.  For a description 
of the various legislative responses, including education programs, see Elizabeth C. 
Eraker, Stemming Sexting: Sensible Legal Approaches to Teenagers’ Exchange of Self-
Produced Pornography, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 555, 573–82 (2010); Audra L. Price, 
Digital Lovers: Keeping Romeo and Juliet Safe from Sexting and Out of the Courthourse, 
20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 355, 365–67 (2011); Jacob J. Szymialis, Sexting: A 
Response to Prosecuting Those Growing up with a Growing Trend, 44 IND. L. REV. 301, 
318–22 (2010). 
 192 See H. 3130, S.C. Gen. Assemb., 119th Sess. (S.C. 2012) (creating the offense of 
sexting and levying a civil fine and providing for an education program for a person 
convicted of committing the offense); Assemb. B. 8131, 2011–12 Reg. Sess. (2011) 
(directing the attorney general to establish a juvenile sexting and cyberbullying education 
demonstration program); S.B. 407, Leg. Sess. 82(R) (Tex. 2011) (creating education 
programs centered on the prevention of sexting).  
 193 The recent legislative reaction to sexting corroborates this belief.  Many states 
suggest some type of education program for teenagers who are discovered sending 
sexually explicit images of themselves. See Szymialis, supra note 191, at 319–22.  
Similarly, most existing legal scholarship on sexting proposes educational programs as a 
better response to sexting than prosecuting minors for violating child pornography 
statutes. See id.; Eraker, supra note 191, at 573.  In this way, legal scholarship, too, seems 
to reflexively follow Freudian thinking.  Like the courts, these recommendations also 
suggest that sexting by minors is somehow wrong and premature, further underscoring 
the notion that sexting is tantamount to some sort of pernicious seduction. See Szymialis, 
supra note 191, at 319–20; Eraker, supra note 191, at 573–82. 
 194 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 57. 
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ensure the complete construction of mental dams.195  And Freud 
hinted that this task that might be accomplished “with the 
assistance of education.”196  Although Freud described 
psychosexual development as an organic process, he explicitly 
allowed for the possibility of educative support as a crucial aspect 
of normal sexual development.197  By punishing sexting and 
ordering counseling programs in an attempt to instill “proper” 
sexual mores, courts implicitly classify teenagers as occupying the 
latency period, and implicitly classify sexting as harmful 
seduction.198 
B. The Harm of Sexting as Seduction 
The most surprising parallel between sexting cases and Freud’s 
conception of seduction is the underlying anxiety about the 
resulting harm.  In both cases, the fear is not immediate abuse.  
Freud never discussed the direct harm stemming from seduction.  
Instead, Freud was worried about the long-term sexual 
development of children.199  By interrupting the latency period, 
seduction results in sexual perversion, compromises the 
construction of the super-ego, and ultimately risks damaging 
civilization itself.200  In sexting cases, judges also typically ignore 
the possibility of immediate harm; after all, sexting is self-
produced child pornography, so there is little immediate abuse to 
think of. 
Focused primarily on immediate harm, scholars have thus 
roundly criticized the decisions of state and federal judges to 
punish children for violating child pornography statutes.201  But 
 
 195 See id. at 43. 
 196 Id. at 98. 
 197 See id. at 43–44. 
 198 See A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (noting the 
appellant was too young to make appropriate decisions). 
 199 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 97–98. 
 200 See The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 35 (“[The super-ego] represents the most 
important characteristics of the development both of the individual and of the species . . . 
.”); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 45. 
 201 See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 174 (suggesting punishing teenagers under 
child pornography statutes is “unduly heavy”); Wastler, supra note 3, at 702 
(“Addressing the problem of child pornography as a new and unique problem will avoid 
constitutional difficulties, prevent the application of overly harsh penalties to juvenile 
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across the United States, judges are worried about a different kind 
of harm.  In the estimation of many courts, the harm from sexting, 
like seduction, is long term and initially unobservable.202  Just as 
Freud detailed the lasting psychological damage done by 
premature exposure to sexual objects, judges are worried about 
long-term psychosexual damage related to sexting.203  This 
concern has been widely ignored in scholarship on child 
pornography and sexting. 
A careful analysis of recent sexting decisions reveals that the 
court is concerned with a broader notion of child abuse than just 
that stemming from the production of images that constitute child 
pornography.204  That is, the harm that child pornography laws are 
intended to protect against includes more than just immediate 
abuse.205  After briefly considering New York v. Ferber,206 the first 
Supreme Court case to consider child pornography, this section 
will analyze more recent decisions of the Supreme Court and 
federal district courts.  Considering these cases, it becomes clear 
that the perceived harm of child pornography, especially self-
produced child pornography, transcends obvious physical and 
emotional harm.  When scholars criticize the law’s irony for 
punishing those it intends to protect, therefore, they deny the law’s 
recognition that children need protection from themselves and each 
other.  Beginning with New York v. Ferber, sexting decisions 
across jurisdictions suggest that courts are concerned with harm to 
 
misadventure, and avoid undermining the legitimacy of traditional child pornography 
regulation.”). 
 202 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 157 (criticizing three state cases for lacking 
sufficient evidence of long-term harm from sexting). 
 203 See, e.g., id. at 150–58; see also Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 152 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(fearing how minors are susceptible to external influences); A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 
(“Mere production of these videos or pictures may also result in psychological trauma to 
the teenagers involved.”). 
 204 See, e.g., Clark v. Roccanova, 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011) (being 
involved with these images can “have a deep psychological, humiliating impact”) 
(quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 6 (1977)); A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (“Mere production of 
these videos or pictures may also result in psychological trauma to the teenagers 
involved.”). 
 205 See, e.g., A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239 (“[I]f these pictures are ultimately released, future 
damage may be done to these minors’ careers or personal lives.”). 
 206 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
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the long-term psychological well-being of the children involved in 
self-produced child pornography and, consequently, with harm to 
society as a whole.207  This harm is essentially Freudian. 
In Ferber, the Supreme Court based its prohibition of child 
pornography, in part, on the grounds that “the use of children as 
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, 
emotional, and mental health of the child.”208  The motivating 
harm, however, was not restricted to the immediate abuse of the 
child involved.209  Citing a Senate report, the Court explained that 
the use of children in pornography is harmful to the children’s 
lasting psychosexual development because sexually exploited 
children “are unable to develop healthy affectionate relationships 
in later life, have sexual dysfunctions, and have a tendency to 
become sexual abusers as adults.”210 
The court also acknowledged in Ferber that the production and 
circulation of a “permanent record”211 of the child’s participation 
in the pornography “may haunt him in future years, long after the 
original misdeed took place.”212  The concern over this 
memorialization was reiterated in the court’s 1990 decision in 
Osborne v. Ohio, which reasoned that “[t]he pornography’s 
continued existence causes the child victims continuing harm by 
haunting the children in years to come,” by creating materials that 
“permanently record the victim’s abuse.”213  The Supreme Court’s 
consideration of the future harm of memorialization and 
circulation, however, has caused many scholars to ignore the other 
future, long-term harm recognized by the Ferber decision, namely, 
the harm to the child’s ability to form future relationship and 
normal sexual development. 
The fear of compromising long-term psychosexual 
development, however, is the primary justification undergirding 
 
 207 See, e.g., Clark, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 847; A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239. 
 208 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758. 
 209 See id. at 758 n.9. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 759. 
 212 Id. at 759 n.10 (quoting David P. Shouvlin, Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of 
Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 535, 545 (1981)). 
 213 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990). 
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recent decisions to charge teenagers with violating child 
pornography laws for sexting.214  Although Ferber was decided 
thirty years ago, the rationale is still relied upon today.  In Clark v. 
Roccanova the judge straightforwardly held that sexting will 
“permanently traumatize and warp the minds of the children 
involved,” covering both the child depicted and the child 
recipient.215  Here, as in A.H. v. State, something about the act of 
sexting itself proves inherently traumatizing, especially for 
children.216 
Accordingly, anxiety about memorialization and circulation is 
not the driving impetus when children are prosecuted for sexting, 
even though there are many attendant harms when child 
pornography is produced.217  In addition to the harm suffered by 
the depicted child, other children are indirectly harmed when child 
pornography is produced.218  Even self-produced and consensual 
child pornography in the form of sexting might be diffusively 
harmful.219  As the Supreme Court noted in Osborne v. Ohio, 
“pedophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into 
sexual activity.”220  In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
 
 214 See, e.g., Clark v. Roccanova, 772 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (E.D. Ky. 2011); A.H. v. 
State, 949 So. 2d 234, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 215 772 F. Supp. at 847 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 3–4 (1977)).  The court reasoned 
that “[e]ncounters which produce child pornography ‘cannot help but have a deep 
psychological, humiliating impact on these youngsters and jeopardize the possibility of 
healthy, affectionate relationships in the future.’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 6 
(1977)). 
 216 See id.; see also A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239. 
 217 See Koppelman, supra note 70, at 1652–54.  Although there is no one position on 
what constitutes the harm from child pornography, there are many attendant harms. Id.  
Interestingly, perception of these harms has shifted over time. Id. at 1652 (“Concern 
about harm to minors has always been central to obscenity law, though the conception of 
harm has shifted over time.”).  
 218 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982) (Where the harm extends to 
“society as a whole,” children other than the victims are also affected.) (quoting S. REP. 
NO. 95-438, at 5 (1977))); see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 (1990) 
(“[P]edophiles use child pornography to seduce other children into sexual activity.”). 
 219 See Sherman, supra note 8, at 150–51 (quoting Mary Graw Leary, The Right and 
Wrong Responses to “Sexting”, DIOCESE OF MADISON (May 12, 2009), 
http://www.madisondiocese.org/Portals/0/Agencies/Safe_Environment/Sexting.pdf). 
 220 495 U.S. at 111. See 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL 
REPORT 649 (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1986) (The Attorney General’s Commission on 
Pornography stating “[c]hild pornography is often used as part of a method of seducing 
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Supreme Court reasoned that virtual child pornography may “whet 
the appetites” of pedophiles.221  It is possible that “sexting” would 
create a similar effect.  Under this reasoning, a sexually explicit 
image of a child sent over a phone could produce drastic results if 
it entered into wider circulation and fell into the hands of a less 
innocent predator. 
Nevertheless, concerns about memorialization and circulation 
alone cannot justify punishing teenagers for engaging in sexting.  
In the 2002 decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the 
Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional a statute that 
prohibited images of child pornography involving exclusively 
virtual images of children.222  In the Court’s judgment, “[v]irtual 
 
child victims.  A child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult or to 
pose for sexually explicit photos can sometimes be convinced by viewing other children 
having ‘fun’ participating in the activity.”); Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 
243–44 (“In Osborne, the Court introduced an entirely new rationale for banning child 
pornography: Pedophiles may use it to seduce new victims or to convince children to 
submit to sexual violation.  Until Osborne, it was unheard of in modern First Amendment 
law that speech could be banned because of the possibility that someone might use it for 
nefarious purposes.”); see also Child Pornography Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2251(10)(B) & (11)(A) (1996) (recognizing that child pornography must be prevented 
because it “inflames the desires of child molesters, pedophiles, and child pornographers . 
. . ;” and because it “encourag[es] a societal perception of children as sexual objects . . . 
.”). 
 221 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 263 (2002).  For an interesting 
discussion on the appropriateness of the term “whet the appetites” used in the legal 
debates about child pornography, see Neil Malamuth & Mark Huppin, Drawing the Line 
on Virtual Child Pornography: Bringing the Law in Line With the Research Evidence, 31 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 773, 781 (2007) (criticizing psychological evidence of 
the connection between viewing child pornography and consequent acts of child abuse). 
 222 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 256.  In 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania analyzed the Ashcroft decision, clarifying that  
[a]s the Court emphasized in its analysis, however, the solution of 
banning virtual child pornography proved to be unconstitutional in 
part because it was not directly targeted toward the protection of real 
children from the harms that may occur in the production of that 
pornography.  Unlike the CPPA, however, §§ 2257 and 2257A do not 
ban any form of speech based upon the harms that may flow from its 
content . . . nor do they reduce protected expression to unprotected 
expression; rather, they impose content-neutral regulations on the 
production of certain expression in order to prevent the sexual 
exploitation of children.  Thus, this Court heeds the caution urged by 
the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, but does not 
find it implicated by these statutes.  
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child pornography is not ‘intrinsically related’ to the sexual abuse 
of children . . . .”223  Although virtual child pornography could lead 
to actual instances of abuse or “whet the appetites” of pedophiles, 
the link to the harm is “contingent and indirect,” and therefore 
cannot justify prohibiting its production.224  As a result, the 
dangers stemming from the circulation of sexually explicit images 
of children cannot be the primary concern of judges punishing 
children for sexting. 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Ashcroft underscores an 
important aspect of the harm for which a court may permissibly 
ban child pornography: it needs to injure an actual child, and the 
harm must be directly related to the child pornography.225  While 
many scholars believe this decision presages the end of sexting 
cases, such interpretations ignore the broader notion of 
psychological damage against which the court is protecting.226  
Scholars who claim that child pornography laws are unreasonably 
narrowly construe the harm stemming from child pornography 
without considering the possibility that self-produced child 
pornography may also cause harm.227  That the decision in Free 
Speech Coalition has not prevented lower courts from prosecuting 
juvenile sexters for violating child pornography laws is telling. 
Although self-produced child pornography may seem harmless, 
especially where production and dissemination are consensual and 
private, a clear distinction has been made between sexting and 
virtual child pornography.  In A.H. v. State, after all, the court 
found immaterial the fact that sexted messages were not shown to 
a third party.  The mere act itself constitutes a hitherto undiagnosed 
harm to the self, best explained through this Freudian logic.  As a 
result, even private sexting is considered intrinsically harmful, 
justifying the injunction that a videotape or picture showing 
 
Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Holder, 729 F. Supp. 2d 691, 735 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 223 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250. 
 224 See id. at 250, 253. 
 225 See id. at 256. 
 226 See Adler, Child Pornography, supra note 2, at 242–43. 
 227 See Sherman, supra note 8, at 150–51. 
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“sexual conduct by a child . . . is never produced.”228  Unlike 
virtual child pornography, sexting causes harm to an actual child 
that is contingent and direct, even if initially imperceptible.229  
When children prematurely treat themselves as sexual objects and 
prematurely expose other children to sexual subjects via sexting, 
the harm is not immediate in the form of physical abuse, but is 
long-term and psychological.230  As recognized by the court in 
Ferber, children featured in pornography “are unable to develop 
healthy affectionate relationships in later life [and] have sexual 
dysfunctions . . . .”231  Later courts have since extended this 
rationale to include self-produced child pornography as well.232 
Diagnosing the attendant dangers of child pornography, the 
Supreme Court in Ferber projected the harm far beyond that to the 
individual child him- or herself.233  It projected that the widespread 
impairment of children’s psychosexual development stemming 
from child pornography, including an inability to form healthy 
attachments later in life, would result in cataclysmic consequences 
for society.234  This is an undeniable echo of Freud’s concern that 
seduction, by disrupting latency, will impair children’s super-ego 
construction which, in turn, will adversely affect all of higher 
civilization. 
Under this reasoning, sexting is no exception to child 
pornography.  Even if the resulting images are self-produced and 
consensual, sexting still exploits children as sexual objects.  
Sexting, consequently, constitutes a form of seduction, eliciting the 
same harms, with the same dual effect on the individuals involved 
and on larger society.  Although many have overlooked the 
 
 228 A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the state 
legislature has a compelling interest in preventing the production of pornographic images 
and videos of children). 
 229 See Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 250 (finding that “the causal link [between virtual child 
pornography production and instances of actual child abuse] is contingent and indirect”). 
 230 See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239. 
 231 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982). 
 232 See Lewin, supra note 25. 
 233 See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 758 n.9. 
 234 See id. (“[T]he use of children as . . . subjects of pornographic materials is very 
harmful to both the children and the society as a whole.”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-438, at 
5 (1977)). 
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pernicious psychological effects of sexting and have focused 
instead on the lack of immediate abuse suffered by the child who 
willingly sends a sexually explicit image of him- or herself,235 
understanding sexting as Freudian seduction makes the harm 
against which the court intends to protect easier to diagnose. 
The fear about sexting is thus the same fear shared by Freud 
over a century ago.  The law’s effort to prolong the latency period 
by requiring educational counseling amounts to a final effort to 
build mental dams and to delay sexual maturation until children are 
ready to encounter sexual objects.  The law’s punishment of 
teenagers who engage in sexting, therefore, may not be as 
unreasonable as it first seems. 
By punishing teenage sexters for self-producing child 
pornography, the law is protecting the latency period from the 
harms related to the seduction of sexting.  As a result, the law is 
not just promoting teenagers’ normal psychosexual development 
and helping to construct teenage super-egos, it is also protecting 
society as a whole, by punishing the very victims the law was 
designed to protect. 
CONCLUSION: DO WE WANT FREUD ON THE COURT? 
Interpreting sexting cases in light of Freud’s theory of sexuality 
offers an explanation for the confusing motives of courts that 
punish children for violating children pornography laws.  With 
Freud in mind, the actions of many courts may begin to seem less 
“unreasonable” and “unjust.”  Of course, the surprising alignment 
with Freud, whose theory by many accounts is outdated,236 might 
also provide a justifiable impetus to reevaluate the goals of the law.  
 
 235 See Wastler, supra note 3, at 698 (arguing that “[s]exting should be considered 
outside the scope of the child pornography exclusion because such images, like virtual 
child pornography, do not involve the sexual abuse of a child,” and explaining that a 
teenager who sexts “does not  suffer the immediate psychological, physical, and 
emotional harm of the kind suffered by child sexual abuse victims”). 
 236 See, e.g., David S. Caudill, Identifying Law’s Unconscious: Disciplinary and 
Rhetorical Contexts, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1075, 1089 (1997) (stating that traditional 
theorists have rejected Freud’s theories as outdated); David S. Caudill, Pierre Schlag’s 
“The Problem of the Subject”: Law’s Need for an Analyst, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 707, 717 
(1993) (claiming that many disregard Freud as outdated). 
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In sexting cases, judges could be taking too seriously Freud’s 
conception of a narrow path to sexual development and the idea 
that “a disposition to perversions is an original and universal 
disposition of the human sexual instinct . . . .”237  Recent sexting 
cases demonstrate courts’ robust efforts to ensure “that normal 
sexual behaviour is developed . . . as a result of . . .  psychical 
inhibitions occurring in the course of maturation . . . [including] 
shame, disgust, pity and the structures of morality and authority 
erected by society.”238  But is this the conception of sexuality we 
want courts to promote today?  Do we really want to continue 
interpreting child pornography laws to hew so closely to Freud’s 
theory of sexuality? 
Regardless of whether we agree with Freud, analyzing sexting 
cases from a Freudian perspective also offers a new position from 
which to criticize the law, providing an alternative response for 
judges confronted with children charged with violating child 
pornography laws.  In his groundbreaking work on sexuality, 
Freud sought to correct the “gross error” of the widely held belief 
that “the sexual instinct is absent in children.”239  Some scholars 
argue that courts are still committing this error by continuing to 
ignore Freud’s revolutionary findings.  The problem, they claim, is 
that courts have denied children all sexuality, thereby explaining 
the overwrought anxiety in child pornography cases.  But the 
problem is just the opposite: courts are too Freudian, and many 
judges are simply getting Freud wrong. 
Over the last century, Freud’s theories have become entrenched 
in the intellectual landscape and become a mainstay of popular 
knowledge independent of the academic debates about Freud and 
his work.  As part of this cultural milieu, legal decision makers 
have been unavoidably, if unknowingly, been exposed to popular 
 
 237 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 97. 
 238 Id. 
 239 SIGMUND FREUD, The Sexual Enlightenment of Children (An Open Letter to Dr. M. 
Fürst), in 9 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 129, 133 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1959) (“It is commonly believed 
that the sexual instinct is absent in children and only begins to emerge in them at puberty 
when the sexual organs mature.  This is a gross error, equally serious in its effects both 
on knowledge and on practice; and it is so easily corrected by observation that one 
wonders how it could ever have been made.”). 
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interpretations of Freudian thinking; after all, “[c]ourts are 
influenced . . . by popular knowledge, and judges as part of an 
educated elite are influenced by social science learning to the 
extent it penetrates their elite culture.”240 
As long as these cases continue to bear a resemblance to Freud 
and the resulting decisions continue to be based on a Freudian 
logic, judges should at least get Freud right.  Moreover, as state 
legislatures increasingly consider resolutions that address juvenile 
sexting, ensuring a proper understanding of Freud is all the more 
important.  In 2012, thirteen states considered bills aimed at 
sexting.241  As this number grows, it becomes increasingly urgent 
that legal actors better understand the motivation underlying the 
decision to prosecute teenagers for sexting.  In light of Freud’s 
theory, judges hearing sexting cases and legislators devising new 
solutions might make three changes to current child pornography 
laws as they relate to sexting. 
First, although the motivations underlying sexting cases chart 
nicely onto Freud’s theory, one crucial aspect of Freud’s diphasic 
model of psychosexual development does not map onto recent 
sexting jurisprudence: timing.242  According to Freud, the “second 
wave [of sexual development] sets in with puberty.”243  Yet, most 
sexting cases involve children who have already begun puberty.244  
The students in Pennsylvania posing in their bras, the New Jersey 
girl who posted pictures of herself online, and the consenting 
sexual partners in Florida are all undeniably in adolescence and, 
 
 240 Richard Lempert, “Between Cup and Lip”: Social Science Influences on Law and 
Policy, 10 LAW & POL’Y, 167, 188 (2008) (examining how social science research 
influences legal decision makers). 
 241 See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-
2012.aspx. 
 242 See generally A.H. v. State, 949 So. 2d 234 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (A.H. was 
sixteen and her boyfriend was seventeen, clearly well past their latency phase, when they 
were charged with child pornography); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, 
supra note 79, at 66 (the choice of a model object is diphasic in that it occurs in two 
waves). 
 243 THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 66. 
 244 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 144–45 (discussing the biological development of 
adolescent brains and thus tendency to engage in risky conduct, including sexting). 
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therefore, out of the latency period.245  With this in mind, many 
jurisdictions are not protecting latency, but are attempting to 
prolong the period.  While this may be for good reason, especially 
if many juveniles who engage in sexting demonstrate a lapse in 
sound judgment, it is fair to question the effects of treating 
teenagers as if they are still in latency when they have moved onto 
the final phase of sexual development. 
Given this insight, judges hearing sexting cases might correct 
their unconscious Freudianism and give credence to the timing of 
Freud’s developmental schema.  If adolescents are no longer in a 
period of latency, courts cannot justify punishing teenager sexters 
for violating child pornography laws by citing concerns about 
future-relationship formation and long-term psychosexual harm.  
Psychosexual development is complete after latency and no 
additional dams can be constructed.246  For that reason, the law 
should carve out an exception for adolescents who engage in 
sexting by creating a “sphere of sexual privacy for older teens” that 
would exempt them from being charged with violating child 
pornography laws.247 
By providing a theoretical account of sexting decisions, Freud 
also offers a new basis from which to criticize or bolster the 
decisions of judges who punish the victim the law intends to 
protect.  If juveniles who practice sexting have already moved 
beyond latency, they have already fully formed their super-egos.248  
 
 245 See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the 
Pennsylvania case of two girls posing in their bras at twelve- and thirteen-years-old); 
A.H., 949 So. 2d at 234 (discussing the Florida case of a sixteen-year-old girl who was 
convicted for sharing sexuality explicit digital photos with her seventeen-year-old 
boyfriend); Sherman, supra note 8, at 145 (discussing the case of a fourteen year-old 
New Jersey girl who posted “racy pictures of herself on her MySpace page”). 
 246 See THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 43 (“It is during 
this period of total or only partial latency that are built up the mental forces which are 
later to impede the course of the sexual instinct and, like damns, restrict its flow—
disgust, feelings of shame and the claims of aesthetic and moral ideals.”). 
 247 See McLaughlin, supra note 7, at 138. 
 248 See generally The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 34–39 (discussing the formation 
of the super-ego); THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 79, at 42 
(“[T]he sexual life of children usually emerges in a form accessible to observation round 
about the third or fourth year of life. It is during this period of total or only partial latency 
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As a result, courts cannot justifiably punish teens in an attempt to 
protect them from the harms of seduction.  Because seduction only 
occurs in latency, courts cannot legitimately be worried about 
adolescents hurting themselves or other adolescents by exposing 
each other to sexual objects prematurely because it is technically 
not premature. 
Instead, by designating teenage sexting as criminal behavior 
equivalent to child pornography—and justifying this designation 
by citing the harm to “society as a whole”249—judges are 
effectually punishing children for lacking a super-ego.  But since 
the teenage defendants have left the latency period, the super-ego 
is already in place.  Judges and prosecutors, therefore, are simply 
failing to recognize it.  By punishing teenage sexting, prosecutors 
and judges are effectively disagreeing with the norms reflected by 
the emerging super-ego of teenager-sexters. 
In Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), Freud posits the 
existence of a cultural super-ego, “under whose influence cultural 
development proceeds.”250  Although the demands of the 
individual super-ego normally “coincide with the precepts of the 
prevailing cultural super-ego,” it is possible for individual super-
egos to diverge.251  Today, it is possible that teenage sexters 
possess an alternative set of moral constructs foreign to the older 
generation sitting on the bench and in the legislature.  By rejecting 
prevailing teenage super-egos through the prosecution of sexting as 
child pornography, it is possible that prosecutors and judges are 
simply anxious about a new, emerging cultural super-ego that 
reflects different values about sex.  If this is the case, the court 
might rightly be censured or extolled for enforcing the traditional 
cultural super-ego.252 
 
that are built up the mental forces which are later to impede the course of the sexual 
instinct . . . .”). 
 249 New York v. Ferber 458 U.S. 747, 758 n.9 (1982). 
 250 21 SIGMUND FREUD, Civilization and its Discontents, in THE STANDARD EDITION OF 
THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 57, 141 (James Strachey ed. 
& trans. 1961). 
 251 Id. at 142. 
 252 Interestingly, the defendant in United States v. Mento made a similar argument, 
contending that “the government’s true purpose in combating child pornography has 
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Given the diffusion of Freud’s ideas, it is perhaps unsurprising 
that judges unknowingly rely on Freud’s theory of sexuality in 
sexting cases.  But even if courts are to correct their unconscious 
Freudianism and recognize the timing of Freud’s model of 
psychosexual development, American courts are only thinking 
about early Freud.  The Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality 
were written in 1905, and in the decades following, Freud 
corrected or adjusted many of his initial theories.253 
As a final critique, we might fairly ask whether it is reasonable 
for the law to enforce super-ego formation at all, even for pre-
adolescent children who might still be in a period of latency.  
Freud’s project, after all, was never normative but was strictly 
descriptive.  If the court really is punishing sexting as child 
pornography in an attempt to prolong latency and dictate super-ego 
formation, a number of criticisms might be raised.  Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process right of parents “to be free 
from state interference with family relations,”254 including choices 
about the upbringing of children, may prevent obvious attempts by 
the states to force its educational program on teenagers.255  
Nevertheless, many states have now developed educational 
programs as an alternative punishment for teenagers who produce 
and disseminate sexually explicit images of themselves.256 
 
impermissibly shifted from preventing tangible harm to real children, toward eradicating 
certain ideas that it considers inherently evil.” 231 F.3d 912, 919 (4th Cir. 2000). 
 253 See, e.g., The Ego and the Id, supra note 95, at 31–34 (detailing an adjustment to the 
Oedipus complex first introduced in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality). 
 254 Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 303 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 255 See Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 643 (M.D. Pa. 2009).  In this case, 
the court cites a number of authorities establishing the right of parents to be free from 
state interference in family relations. Id. at 643–644; see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 
U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that “the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control 
of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental  liberty interests recognized 
by” the Supreme Court); Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303; M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 
(1996) (finding that “[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children 
are among associational rights” basic to our society . . . .”).  Finally the court held that 
“[a]s early as 1923, the Supreme Court found that ‘the “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause includes the right of parents to “establish a home and bring up children” 
and “to control the education of their own.”’” Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 644 
(quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 256 See 2012 Sexting Legislation, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 26, 
2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom/sexting-legislation-2012.aspx.   
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Even if the state may permissibly be involved in super-ego 
formation through educational programs about sexting, we might 
fairly question whether the state should be involved.  It may be 
true that charging teenage sexters with violating child pornography 
laws “ultimately cause[s] a lifetime of harm”257 that surpasses even 
the harm of sexting.258  After publishing his Three Essays, Freud 
regularly discussed the antagonism between civilization and 
instinctual life, admitting that the mental dams learned during 
latency might ultimately prove harmful.259  In “‘Civilized’ Sexual 
Morality and Modern Nervous Illness,” Freud explained that, “we 
shall find that the injurious influence of civilization reduces itself 
in the main to the harmful suppression of the sexual life of 
civilized peoples (or classes) through the ‘civilized’ sexual 
morality prevalent in them.”260  Ultimately, Freud concluded that 
“the damage done by civilized sexual morality” may be 
permissible because “the cultural gain derived from such an 
extensive restriction of sexuality probably more than balances 
these sufferings, which, after all, only affect a minority in any 
severe form.”261  Today, as the practice of sexting continues to 
grow, it seems that the minority who suffer for not fitting into the 
majority’s concept of civilized sexuality—namely, teenagers who 
engage in sexting—may be larger than Freud ever suspected.  And 
the punishment they suffer may be unduly severe.  If imposing 
prison sentences on teenagers and requiring their registration as 
sex offenders is the new form that this suffering takes, we should 
ask whether punishing sexting as child pornography is still 
counterbalanced by the cultural gain of “civilized sexual morality” 
that Freud recognized. 
 
 
 257 Arcabascio, supra note 42, para. 33. 
 258 See id. 
 259 See, e.g., SIGMUND FREUD, “Civilized” Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous 
Illness, in 9 THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF 
SIGMUND FREUD 177, 181 (James Strachey ed. & trans. 1959) (“It is not difficult to 
suppose that under the domination of a civilized sexual morality the health and efficiency 
of single individuals may be liable to impairment.”). 
 260 Id. at 185. 
 261 Id. at 196. 
